

STATEMENT OF NELSON PIQUET JUNIOR TO FIA

I, **Nelson Ângelo Piquet**, born July 25, 1985 in Heidelberg, Germany, currently residing at 6, avenue des Lignes, apt. 9em 32, Monaco, say as follows:

1. Except as otherwise stated, the facts and statements contained in this Statement are based on facts and matters within my knowledge. I believe such facts and statements contained in this Statement to be true and correct. Where any facts or statements are not within my own knowledge, they are true to the best of my knowledge and belief and, where appropriate, I indicate the source of that knowledge and belief.
2. I make this Statement voluntarily to the FIA and for the purposes of allowing the FIA to exercise its supervisory and regulatory functions with regard to the FIA Formula One World Championship.
3. I am aware that there is a duty upon all participants in the FIA Formula One World Championship and all Super Licence holders to ensure the fairness and legitimacy of the Championship and I am aware that serious consequences could follow if I were to provide the FIA with any false or misleading statement.
4. I understand that my complete statement has been recorded on audio tape and that a full transcript of my audio recording will be made available to me and the FIA. The present document constitutes a summary of the main points made during my full oral statement.
5. I wish to bring the following facts to the FIA's attention.
6. During the Formula One Grand Prix of Singapore, held on 28 September 2008 and counting towards the 2008 FIA Formula One World Championship, I was asked by Mr. Flavio Briatore, who is both my manager and the Team Principal of the Renault F1 Team, and by Mr Pat Symonds, the Technical Director of the ING Renault F1 Team, to deliberately crash my car in order to positively influence the performance of the ING Renault F1 team at the event in question. I agreed to this proposal and caused my car to hit a wall and crash during lap thirteen/fourteen of the race.

7. The proposal to deliberately cause an accident was made to me shortly before the race took place, when I was summoned by Mr Briatore and Mr Symonds in Mr Briatore's office. Mr Symonds, in the presence of Mr Briatore, asked me if I would be willing to sacrifice my race for the team by "causing a safety car". Every F1 race driver knows that the safety car is deployed on a track when there is an accident which leads to the track being blocked either by debris or a stationary car, and where it is difficult to recover a damaged car, as was the case here.

8. At the time of this conversation I was in a very fragile and emotional state of mind. This state of mind was brought about by intense stress due to the fact that Mr Briatore had refused to inform me of whether or not my driver's contract would be renewed for the next racing year (2009), as is customarily the case in the middle of the year (around July of August). Instead, Mr Briatore repeatedly requested me to sign an "option", which meant that I was not allowed to negotiate with any other teams in the mean time. He would repeatedly put pressure on me to prolong the option I had signed, and would regularly summon me into his office to discuss these renewals, even on racing days – a moment which should be a moment of concentration and relaxation before the race. This stress was accentuated by the fact that during the Formula One Grand Prix of Singapore I had qualified sixteenth on the grid, so I was very insecure about my future at the Renault team. When I was asked to crash my car and cause a safety car incident in order to help the team, I accepted because I hoped that it could improve my position within the team at this critical time in the race season. At no point was I told by anyone that by agreeing to cause an incident, I would be guaranteed a renewal of my contract or any other advantage. However, in the context, I thought that it would be helpful in achieving this goal. I therefore agreed to cause the incident.

9. After the meeting with Mr Symonds and Mr Briatore, Mr Symonds took me aside to a quiet corner and, using a map, pointed me to the exact corner of the track where I should crash. This corner was selected because the specific location of the track did not have any cranes that would allow a damaged car to be swiftly lifted off the track, nor did it have any side entrances to the track, which would allow a Safety Marshall to quickly move the damaged car away from the track. Therefore, it was felt that a crash in this specific position would be nearly certain to cause an obstruction on the

track which would thus necessitate the deployment of a safety car in order to allow the track to be cleared and to ensure the safe continuation of the race.

10. Mr Symonds also told me which exact lap to cause the incident upon, so that a strategy could be deployed for my team-mate Mr Fernando Alonso to refuel at the pit shortly before the deployment of the safety car, which he indeed did during lap twelve. The key to this strategy resided in the fact that the near-knowledge that the safety car would be deployed in lap thirteen/fourteen allowed the Team to start Mr Alonso's car with an aggressive fuel strategy using a light car containing enough fuel to arrive at lap twelve, but not much more. This would allow Mr Alonso to overtake as many (heavier) cars as possible, knowing that those cars would have difficulty catching up with him later in the race due to the later deployment of the safety car. This strategy was successful and Mr Alonso won the 2008 Formula One Grand Prix of Singapore.
11. During these discussions, no mention was made of any concerns with respect to the security implications of this strategy, either for myself, the public or other drivers. The only comment made in this context was one by Mr Pat Symonds who warned me to "be careful", which I took to mean that I should not injure myself.
12. I intentionally caused the crash by letting go of control of the car just before the relevant corner. In order to make sure I would cause the incident during the correct lap, I asked my team several times via the radio to confirm the lap number, which I would not normally do. I was not injured during the accident, nor was anyone else.
13. After the discussions with Mr Briatore and Mr Symonds discussed above, the 'accident strategy' was never discussed again with either of them. Mr Briatore discreetly said "thank you" after the end of the race, without mentioning anything further. I do not know if anyone else was aware of this strategy at the start of the race.
14. After the race I informed Mr Felipe Vargas, a family friend and adviser, of the fact that the incident had been deliberate. Mr Vargas further informed my father, Mr Nelson Piquet, some time later.
15. After the race several journalists asked questions about the accident and asked me whether I had caused it on purpose, because they felt it was 'suspicious'.



16. In my own team, the engineer of my car questioned the nature of the incident because he found it unusual, and I replied that I had lost control of the car. I believe that a clever engineer would notice from the car's telemetry that I caused the incident on purpose as I continued accelerating , whereas a "normal" reaction would be to brake as soon as possible.

Statement of Truth

I believe and swear that the facts set out in this statement are true.

This statement was made in at the FIA Headquarters in Paris on 30 July 2009 in presence of Mr. Alan Donnelly (FIA Chairman of the Stewards), Mr. Martin Smith and Mr. Jacob Marsh (both of investigations firm Quest, retained by the FIA to assist with its investigation). Notes were taken by Ms. Dominique Costesec (Sidley Austin LLP).

Signed:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'N. Piquet Jr.', written in a cursive style.

Nelson Piquet Jr.

Paris, 30 July 2009

SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF NELSON PIQUET JUNIOR TO FIA

I, Nelson Ângelo Piquet, born July 25, 1985 in Heidelberg, Germany, currently residing at 6, avenue des Ligures, apt. 9em 32, Monaco, say as follows:

1. Except as otherwise stated, the facts and statements contained in this Supplementary Statement are based on facts and matters within my knowledge. I believe such facts and statements contained in this Supplementary Statement to be true and correct. Where any facts or statements are not within my own knowledge, they are true to the best of my knowledge and belief and, where appropriate, I indicate the source of that knowledge and belief.
2. I am a professional racing driver and holder of an FIA Super Licence. I was employed by the ING Renault F1 Team (Renault) in 2007 as a test driver and in 2008 and 2009 (until the end of July) as a racing driver.
3. I make this Supplementary Statement voluntarily to the FIA and for the purposes of allowing the FIA to exercise its supervisory and regulatory functions with regard to the FIA Formula One World Championship ("Championship").
4. I am aware that there is a duty upon all participants in the FIA Formula One World Championship and all Super Licence holders to ensure the fairness and legitimacy of the Championship and I am aware that serious consequences could follow if I were to provide the FIA with any false or misleading statement.
5. Following the statement I made at the FIA's Headquarters in Paris on 30 July 2009, I was asked to attend a second interview in London in order to provide further information relating to my crash at the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix and to review preliminary telemetry data sourced by the FIA's Technical Department. This Supplementary Statement constitutes a summary of the main points made in the course of my second interview insofar as those main points are not addressed in my statement of 30 July 2009.
6. In the evening of Saturday 27 September 2008, following earlier meetings regarding my contract situation with Renault Team Principal, Mr Flavio Briatore, and following my poor performance in qualifying (in which I qualified sixteenth on the grid), I had a long call with my friend and adviser, Mr Felipe Vargas. I was alone in my hotel room and very emotional. I believe the relevant mobile telephone records will demonstrate that I had this long call with Mr Vargas.
7. I arrived at the circuit on Sunday 28 September 2008 around four to five hours before the scheduled start time for the race. As the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix was a night race, starting at 8pm local time, I believe I would have arrived at the circuit at around 3pm to 4pm.

8. Soon after arriving at the circuit – I believe between 4pm and 5pm local time – I was summoned to attend Mr Briatore in his office. I believe I was summoned by Mr Briatore’s assistant, Matthieu Michel. As I had been summoned to Mr Briatore’s office on a number of prior occasions in order to discuss my contract situation, I assumed this to be the reason for my summons on this occasion.
9. Mr Briatore’s office at the Singapore Grand Prix was located within Renault’s temporary offices, which were set up within the paddock area. When I entered the office, which was relatively small and in which there were four or five chairs and a small table, Mr. Briatore and Mr. Pat Symonds, Renault’s Executive Director of Engineering, were present.
10. At the meeting in Mr Briatore’s office, Mr Symonds explained to me that there was a possibility for the Renault team to achieve a good result notwithstanding the fact that I had qualified 16th on the grid and my team mate, Fernando Alonso, had qualified 15th. Mr Symonds referred back to the 2008 German Grand Prix at which I had finished second after benefiting from the safety car being deployed following an accident involving a driver from another team. He then explained that, if one of the Renault team’s cars could cause the safety car to be deployed, the other car could benefit, enabling the team overall to record a good result. As set out in my statement of 30 July 2009, Mr Symonds then asked me if I would cause a safety car. For the reasons set out in that same statement, I agreed to the plan.
11. In the course of the meeting, Mr Briatore said very little. As the meeting drew to a close, Mr Symonds told me that I should not speak about the plan with anyone else and said that he would give me further instructions shortly. I believe the meeting in Mr Briatore’s office lasted no more than ten minutes.
12. Shortly after the meeting, Mr Symonds approached me in the section of Renault’s temporary offices comprising a series of tables and chairs at which the team members would typically take their meals over the course of a race weekend. I believe he approached me between five and thirty minutes after the conclusion of the meeting in Mr Briatore’s office. In the course of this conversation, as set out in my statement of 30 July 2009, Mr Symonds indicated, with the assistance of a map of the circuit, where and when I should crash in order to ensure that the safety car was deployed to the benefit of Mr Alonso.
13. At around 6pm on Sunday 28 September – i.e. around two hours before the start of the race – I attended the usual pre-race briefing meeting. At that meeting, Mr Symonds made a number of points in relation to car set-up and fuelling strategies. It was explained to those present (who included Mr Alonso, me, our respective race engineers and Renault’s lead strategist) that Mr Alonso would be pitting on lap twelve and that I would be pitting much later.

14. After ensuring I was on the designated lap of the race, I deliberately lost control of my car on the exit to turn 17. I did this by pressing hard and early on the throttle. As I felt the back end of the car drifting out, I continued to press hard on the throttle, in the knowledge that this would lead to my car making heavy contact with the concrete wall on the far side of the track and thereby cause a crash necessitating the deployment of the safety car.
15. I have now seen telemetry data taken from my car's Standard Data Recorder (SDR) and presented to me by the FIA. The SDR telemetry clearly demonstrates that I pressed significantly harder and earlier on the throttle on the exit to turn 17 on the lap in question than on previous laps. **[See the annotated telemetry data at Exhibit 1 to this Supplementary Statement.]**
16. Once the back end of the car had begun to drift out, the only way of recovering control of the car and avoiding a contact with the concrete wall would have been to back off on the throttle. However, I did not back off the throttle to any material extent. Rather, I pressed hard on the throttle beyond the moment at which the back end started to drift out and, indeed, right up to and beyond the point of impact with the concrete wall. Again, the fact that I did not back off the throttle is apparent from the SDR telemetry readings of the incident. **[See the annotated telemetry data at Exhibit 1 to this Supplementary Statement.]**
17. In my statement of 30 July 2009, I stated that I believed the car's telemetry would show that I caused the accident on purpose. I have now seen some of that telemetry and consider that it clearly supports my statement that I caused the crash deliberately because it demonstrates that on the exit to turn 17 on the lap of the crash: (i) I pressed harder and earlier on the throttle than in previous laps; (ii) I continued to press harder on the throttle than in previous laps notwithstanding the fact that the back end had started to slide out and I had started to lose control of the car; and (iii) I continued to press harder on the throttle than in previous laps up to and even beyond the point of impact with the concrete wall.

Statement of Truth

I believe and swear that the facts set out in this statement are true.

This statement was made at the offices of Quest (the firm retained by the FIA to assist with its investigation) in London on 17 August 2009 in the presence of Mr. Martin Smith and Mr. Jacob Marsh (both of Quest), Mr. Patrick Harrison (of Sidley Austin LLP) and Mr Alan Prudom (of the FIA Technical Department).

Signed:

Nelson Piquet Jr.

Nelson Piquet Jr. Monaco 25/08/09



FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE DE L'AUTOMOBILE

Mr Max Mosley
President FIA
8 place de la Concorde
75008 Paris
France

4 September 2009

Dear President

We refer to your letter of 25 August 2009 regarding allegations by the Super Licence holder, Nelson Piquet Jnr, that he conspired with his team, ING Renault F1 (Renault), to cause a deliberate crash at the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix with the aim of causing the deployment of the safety car to the advantage of Renault's other driver, Fernando Alonso.

It being impractical to reconvene the Stewards of the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix, you requested that a meeting of the Stewards of the 2009 Belgian Grand Prix (being the undersigned International Stewards, Lars Österlind and Vassilis Despotopoulos and the national steward, Yves Bacquelaine) and the FIA Observer, Herbie Blash, be convened in order to conduct further enquiries into the incident in question. This meeting was duly convened and further enquiries were carried out both at the 2009 Belgian Grand Prix and immediately thereafter.


Following conclusion of these enquiries, the attached report has been prepared, which we hereby submit for the FIA's attention in accordance with Article 152 of the International Sporting Code.

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Lars Österlind', written over a horizontal line.

Lars Österlind
FIA International Steward

8, place de la Concorde, 75008 Paris
Tél. : +33 1 43 12 44 55, Fax : +33 1 43 12 44 66



FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE DE L'AUTOMOBILE

Mr Max Mosley
President FIA
8 place de la Concorde
75008 Paris
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4 September 2009

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Yours sincerely

Lars Österlind
FIA International Steward

Vassilis Despotopoulos
FIA International Steward

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REPORT OF STEWARDS' INVESTIGATION IN RELATION TO THE 2008 SINGAPORE GRAND PRIX

A Background and allegations made to the FIA

Introduction

1. On 26 July 2009, the FIA was contacted by Nelson Piquet Snr and informed that Nelson Piquet Jnr ("NPJ") wanted to make a statement concerning an incident at the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix.
2. It was arranged that NPJ would attend an interview at the FIA's offices in Paris on 30 July 2009. At that interview, NPJ provided a statement to the Chairman of the Stewards and an FIA external adviser from Quest, an investigations firm. A full copy of NPJ's signed statement dated 30 July 2009 appears at **Appendix 1** to this report.

Allegations made to the FIA

3. The key allegations made by NPJ are summarised below.
 - 3.1 Shortly before the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix on Sunday 28 September, ING Renault F1 ("Renault") Team Principal, Mr Briatore, summoned NPJ to his office where Mr Symonds, Renault's Executive Director of Engineering was also present. At that meeting, in the presence of Mr Briatore, Mr Symonds asked NPJ whether he would be willing to cause the safety car to be deployed in order to benefit his team-mate, Mr Alonso. Those present at the meeting understood that the request to cause the safety car to be deployed was, in effect, a request to crash deliberately. In part because of his fragile state of mind caused by the difficulties he had been experiencing in securing a contract to race for Renault in the 2009 season, NPJ agreed.
 - 3.2 Shortly after that meeting, Mr Symonds approached NPJ, showed him a map of the Singapore Grand Prix circuit and told him that he was to crash at Turn 17 on Lap 13/14. NPJ was informed by Mr Symonds that a crash at this point of the circuit would lead to the deployment of the safety car as the safety equipment and lifting cranes would not be able to access the scene of the accident quickly.
 - 3.3 NPJ was also told that Mr Alonso's car would be fuelled light and that his team-mate would pit shortly before the safety car, thus securing a significant advantage over the rest of the field.
 - 3.4 Prior to the crash, NPJ asked the team several times via the radio to confirm the lap he was on in order to ensure that he caused the incident during the correct lap. NPJ stated that it is unusual for a driver to enquire about the lap he was on, early in a race, when there was no prospect of him pitting in the near future.

- 3.5 At Turn 17 of Lap 14 of the Singapore Grand Prix, NPJ deliberately crashed his car, causing the deployment of the safety car. Mr Alonso benefited significantly from the timing of his pit stop and the deployment of the safety car following NPJ's accident and went on to record Renault's first victory of the year.
- 3.6 After the race, Mr Briatore discretely said "thank you" to NPJ. Thereafter, an engineer on NPJ's car questioned the nature of the incident as he found it unusual, but NPJ told him that he had simply lost control of the car.
- 3.7 NPJ believed that the telemetry data would confirm that the accident was caused on purpose because it would show that he continued accelerating into the accident whereas a "normal" reaction would be to lift off the throttle or brake as soon as possible.

FIA Response

4. At the time of NPJ's allegations, there were rumours suggesting that Renault had exercised an option to terminate NPJ's contract. It was also rumoured that there was, and had been for some time, considerable ill-feeling between the Piquet family and Mr Briatore. After the provision of NPJ's statement, the FIA was alerted to a number of press statements made by NPJ in which he expressed his anger at his treatment by Mr Briatore. As a result, the Stewards understand that the FIA President requested that, before the matter was taken any further, some independent support for NPJ's statement should be sought.
5. The Stewards were informed that members of the FIA's Technical Department were asked to review the telemetry data relating to the crash. The Technical Department's preliminary view was that the available data showed unusual features which appeared to lend support to NPJ's allegations.

Further statement

6. NPJ was interviewed again on 17 August 2009 and provided a signed Supplementary Statement to the FIA dated 25 August 2009. In that Supplementary Statement (which appears at **Appendix 2** to this report), NPJ provided additional information on the timing of the various race day meetings at the Singapore Grand Prix and reviewed the telemetry data made available by the FIA Technical Department. NPJ stated that the available telemetry data clearly supported his allegation that the crash was deliberate.

Reference to the FIA Stewards and Procedure

7. It being impractical to reconvene the Stewards of the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix, the FIA President requested, pursuant to Article 179(b) of the International Sporting Code ("ISC"), that a meeting of the Stewards of the 2009 Belgian Grand Prix (Lars Österlind, Vassilis Despotopoulos and Yves Bacquellaine) ("Stewards") and the FIA Observer (Herbie Blash) be convened in order to conduct further enquiries into the allegations ("Stewards' Investigation") with a view to the

preparation by the International Stewards of a report under Article 152 ISC.¹ In carrying out the Stewards' Investigation, and in gathering information in relation thereto, the Stewards have been assisted by the FIA Technical Department and the FIA's external advisors, Sidley Austin LLP and Quest.

8. Certain Renault employees whom it was considered might have information relevant to the Stewards' Investigation were summoned to come to the Stewards' room for interview. Before each interview, the Chairman of the Stewards handed the interviewee a notice setting out the nature of the allegations, the obligation to be full and frank in providing information and the need for confidentiality.
9. At the outset of the interview, the Stewards provided an additional oral explanation of the nature of the allegations. Questions were then put to the interviewees in relation to their roles and actions at the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix. Interviewees were also asked to consider whether they might have in their possession any documents of relevance to the Stewards' Investigation and, if so, to produce them to the Stewards. In the course of the afternoon of 27 August and the morning of 28 August, the Stewards met with all individuals identified at that stage as being relevant to the Stewards' Investigation. On 28 August, the Stewards were handed a hard disc containing what Renault stated to be its entire data file (except car data) from the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix. Further information and documents were also provided to the Stewards by Mr Briatore on the morning of 29 August.

(B) The available technical and other information

10. The Stewards were reminded of the safety car rules as applicable in the 2007 and 2008 FIA Formula One World Championship. In short, once the safety car had been deployed, cars were prevented from pitting until all cars had lined up in formation behind the safety car.² The Stewards were also reminded of the fact that, at the 2008 German Grand Prix on 20 July 2008, Renault had benefited from the timing of the deployment of the safety car after an incident involving the Toyota driver, Glock. In that race, NPJ had finished second, having been in the pits at the time that the safety car was deployed.
11. The Stewards were reminded of the position in the 2008 FIA Formula One World Championship. Renault drivers, Fernando Alonso and NPJ had amassed 28 and 13 points respectively. Neither driver was in contention for the 2008 FIA Formula One Drivers' World Championship. Renault were in joint fourth place with Toyota in the 2008 FIA Formula One Constructors' World Championship with 41 points.

¹ The Stewards understand that, due to an unrelated decision of the Stewards of the Hungarian Grand Prix, it had not been clear whether Renault would participate at the European Grand Prix in Valencia in the week commencing 17 August 2009.

² This rule has since been changed.

12. Having shown good pace in the practice sessions for the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix, Mr Alonso qualified in a disappointing 15th place on the grid after suffering a fuel pump problem at the start of the second qualifying session. NPJ qualified 16th on the grid.
13. The Stewards were assisted in their consideration of the incident by viewing video footage provided by the FIA Technical Department. A moving map was also made available, together with maps of the circuit, including a map showing the location of safety and lifting equipment (**Appendix 3**).
14. The FIA Technical Department had also produced print outs of telemetry data relating to NPJ's crash for the Stewards' review. In summary, the telemetry data appeared to the Stewards to indicate: (i) that NPJ had hit the throttle at Turn 17 on Lap 14 harder and earlier than in the preceding laps; (ii) that, as a result, NPJ's car had suffered significant wheel spin at Turn 17 on Lap 14; (iii) that, notwithstanding the significant wheel spin, after a very slight reduction in throttle pressure, NPJ had again increased the throttle pressure to 100%; and (iv) that NPJ had stayed hard on the throttle long after he had lost control of the car. Members of the FIA Technical Department indicated that this was unusual telemetry data and a highly unusual driver reaction for the particular situation.
15. The FIA Technical Department also provided a print out from Mr Alonso's telemetry data in which he had responded to wheel spin being generated at Turn 17 of the Singapore Grand Prix (although not on the same lap) by easing off the throttle. (A number of the telemetry data print outs produced by the FIA Technical Department appear at **Appendix 4** to this report.)
16. At the time of the interviews on 27 and 28 August, the Stewards had not heard the pit-to-car communications from the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix, the FIA not having retained a copy. However, this information was provided by Renault in response to the Stewards' request to provide all relevant information and was reviewed after the interviews. It is summarised, insofar as the Stewards believe it to be relevant to their investigation, at section D, below.

(C) The evidence arising out of interviews on 27 and 28 August

17. The Stewards summoned Mr Alonso, Mr Briatore, Mr Symonds and a number of Renault's other engineers to attend interviews in the Stewards' room. The interviews were attended by the Stewards of the meeting, the Chairman of the Stewards, the FIA Observer and the FIA's external advisers from Sidley Austin LLP and Quest. The following is a summary of the evidence provided in the course of the interviews insofar as it appears to the Stewards to be relevant to the allegations made by NPJ. It is worth noting at the outset that the following three points were generally accepted, including by the interviewees: (i) causing a deliberate crash would endanger safety;³ (ii) that a crash of the kind and at the

³ Mr Symonds disputed this point, claiming that, where the safety car is deployed, this removes the danger.

location of NPJ's at the Singapore Grand Prix would be likely to lead to the deployment of the safety car;⁴ and (iii) that the deployment of the safety car had benefited Mr Alonso significantly.

Mr Alonso:

18. Mr Alonso was interviewed first. He stated that he knew nothing of any meetings in the lead-up to the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix attended by Mr Briatore, Mr Symonds and NPJ and knew nothing of the alleged plan to cause a deliberate crash. Mr Alonso also stated that Renault's strategy of fuelling him short represented an aggressive strategy but one that was reflective (to him at least) of the fact that he had qualified unexpectedly low on the grid and in these circumstances he would not have benefited from adopting a strategy similar to those ahead of him. He said the question of strategy was one which he largely left to his engineers.
19. Mr Alonso was shown telemetry data in relation to his own response to wheel spin at Turn 17 of the Singapore Grand Prix. He commented that his reaction as shown by that data – i.e. to lift his foot off the throttle and to reapply pressure on the throttle once the wheel spin had begun to subside – reflected a normal driver response to wheel spin while taking a corner.⁵ The Stewards did not consider it appropriate to ask Mr Alonso to analyse the telemetry data relating to NPJ's crash and compare the two.

Mr Symonds:

20. Mr Symonds was interviewed immediately after Mr Alonso. Mr Symonds' evidence appears to the Stewards to be central to the Stewards' Investigation. Accordingly, relevant extracts from Mr Symonds' interview are set out in this report. From these extracts, at least the following points emerge:
 - 20.1 Mr Symonds accepted that he attended a meeting in Mr Briatore's office with Mr Briatore and NPJ on the Sunday of the Singapore Grand Prix.
 - 20.2 Mr Symonds stated that Mr Briatore had arranged for NPJ to be called into the meeting in Mr Briatore's office.
 - 20.3 Mr Symonds accepted that he had discussed with NPJ the possibility of a deliberate crash at the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix, although he said the suggestion was raised by NPJ.

⁴ Mr Briatore disputed this point at interview, stating that Renault had no guarantee that the safety car would be deployed.

⁵ However, Mr Alonso made it clear that a driver's response to wheel spin would vary depending on factors such as the type of corner, the point of the corner at which the wheel spin occurred and the condition of the car's tyres.

- 20.4 Mr Symonds declined to answer questions in relation to a number of key allegations that were put to him on the basis of the evidence provided by NPJ.
- 20.5 Mr Symonds was warned that the Stewards may draw conclusions from his refusal to answer the specific allegations and Mr Symonds said he would expect that to be the case.

21. The following are extracts from a transcript of the interview with Mr Symonds:

FIA adviser: [In relation to the meeting among Mr Briatore, Mr Symonds and NPJ on the day of the race.] *In your own words Mr. Symonds what do you recall being said to Nelson Piquet Jnr at that meeting? This is shortly before the race.*

Symonds: *I don't really remember it.*

FIA adviser: *You don't remember?*

Symonds: *No.*

FIA adviser: *Nelson Piquet Jnr says that he was asked by you to cause a deliberate crash. Is that true?*

Symonds: *Nelson had spoken to me the day before and suggested that. That's all I'd really like to say.*

[...]

FIA adviser: *Mr Symonds were you aware that there was going to be a crash at Lap 14?*

Symonds: *I don't want to answer that question.*

[...]

FIA adviser: *There is just one thing that I ought to ask you and put it to you so you can think about it at least. Mr. Piquet Jnr says that having had the initial meeting with you and Flavio Briatore you then met with him individually with the map of the circuit. Do you remember that?*

Symonds: *I won't answer, rather not answer that. I don't recall it but it sounds like Nelson's talked a lot more about it.*

FIA adviser: *Mr. Piquet Jnr also says that at that meeting you pointed out a specific place on the circuit where he was to have the accident and said it was because it was the furthest away from any of the safety or lifting equipment and gave the most likely chance of a safety car being deployed.*

Symonds: *I don't, I don't want to answer that question.*

[...]

FIA adviser: [Referring to the meeting in Mr Briatore's office among Mr Briatore, Mr Symonds and NPJ.] *Was it you that did the talking at that meeting Mr. Symonds?*

Symonds: *I'm sure it would have been both of us but I don't know for sure. Sorry that's a contradiction. I would imagine it would be both of us that would be normal. Actually probably more often it's Flavio that does the talking himself. I wouldn't necessarily always agree with what he's saying but the majority.*

FIA adviser: *Because just to be absolutely clear here what Nelson Piquet Jnr has said is that at that meeting it was you that asked him to have the crash deliberately?*

Symonds: *I can't answer you.*

FIA adviser: *Can I say that if Mr. Symonds you'd been put in the position where you were made to ask Mr. Piquet Jnr to crash it's much better, it would be much better for you in the long term to tell these stewards to hear that today?*

Symonds: *I fully understand that.*

FIA adviser: *Yes.*

Symonds: *I have no intention of lying to you. I have not lied to you but I have reserved my position just a little.*

FIA adviser: *And you're aware that the stewards may draw conclusions from your unwillingness to assist them in relation to what went on in that meeting?*

Symonds: *I would expect them to. I would absolutely expect that.*

FIA adviser: *I think I haven't got any further questions.*

22. On the basis of the interview with Mr Symonds, it appears to the Stewards that there was indeed a meeting on the Sunday of the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix in Mr Briatore's office, which was attended by Mr Symonds and to which NPJ was summoned. It also appears reasonable in the circumstances to infer from Mr Symonds' failure to deny the specific allegations: (i) that there was discussion in or around that meeting of a deliberate crash; and (ii) that, at a short meeting thereafter, Mr Symonds had indeed indicated to NPJ on what lap – and where on the circuit – he ought to crash in order to ensure that the safety car was deployed to the benefit of Mr Alonso. In this regard, the Stewards note that, had there been no substance to the allegations made by NPJ and put to Mr Symonds, it would have been straightforward for Mr Symonds to deny them.
23. Mr Symonds was also shown telemetry data from Mr Alonso's wheel spin at Turn 17 (albeit not from Lap 14) of the Singapore Grand Prix and telemetry data from NPJ's crash. The following is taken from the section of the interview transcript where the relevant telemetry was discussed:

FIA adviser: [...] Mr. Alonso also told us that it would be [...] unusual if you feel that you've got wheel spin to apply the throttle still at full pressure. That that is likely to exacerbate the problems. Do you agree with that?

Symonds: Yes absolutely.

FIA adviser: Can we then look please at Mr. Piquet Jnr's telemetry [...] We've got two copies. Have you got the other one here Mr. Symonds?

Symonds: I have yes. Yeah.

FIA adviser: I think you'll anticipate what I'm going to ask you here.

Symonds: I think I will.

FIA adviser: There's quite, there's a more significant wheel spin recorded here. You'll see what has been marked by the technical department as a rapid increase in throttle pedal.

Symonds: Mm mm.

FIA adviser: There is on the throttle, there's a slight releasing of the throttle as the wheels start to spin but when the spin is at its greatest there appears to be a reapplication of the throttle at almost 100%.

Symonds: Yes.

[...]

FIA adviser: I put it to you Mr. Symonds that that's a very unusual piece of telemetry that would suggest that this may have been a deliberate crash?

Symonds: I would agree it's unusual [...]

FIA adviser: Would it suggest to you a deliberate crash?

Symonds: I'm not sure I've ever seen a deliberate crash so I, it's very unusual data.

FIA adviser: Counter-intuitive for a driver to put his foot full on the throttle when he's in a deep spin like that Mr. Symonds?

Symonds: It is. Yes when he has that much wheel spin it's counter-intuitive.

24. The Stewards note that Mr Symonds agreed with the FIA Technical Department's assessment that the telemetry data relating to NPJ's crash was unusual. It is also noteworthy that Mr Symonds accepted that NPJ's response to the wheel spin of putting his foot full on the throttle was "counter-intuitive". Mr Symonds made these observations in the context of knowing he had discussed a deliberate crash with NPJ before the race.
25. The Stewards also discussed Mr Alonso's strategy for the race with Mr Symonds to determine whether others in the Renault team might have been aware of the deliberate crash plan alleged to have been agreed among NPJ, Mr Symonds and

Mr Briatore. Although accepting that the decisions to fuel Mr Alonso light and to call him into the pits on Lap 12 were somewhat unusual, Mr Symonds stated that they were indicative of an aggressive approach and related to tyre choice and track position, rather than a result solely of discussions with NPJ regarding a possible deliberate crash on Lap 14. Mr Symonds's recollection of the genesis of Mr Alonso's strategy was not perfect at the time of interview but Mr Symonds did ensure the provision to the Stewards of information relating to Mr Alonso's strategy on 28 August 2009. This is examined in more detail at section (D), below.

26. Mr Symonds suggested at his interview on 27 August that he might wish to revert to the Stewards with further information, including information responsive to the various questions he had declined to answer. However, no such further information was provided on 27 August. On 28 August, Mr Symonds was summoned back before the Stewards to be asked if he wanted to give further information on the questions he had declined to answer. Mr Symonds again declined to answer the questions but did state that he had had an opportunity to review his files and listen to the pit-to-car communications relating to the race. As a result, he recalled that Renault had pulled Mr Alonso into the pits early as they did not want him to be held up by the Williams driver, Nakajima, and that Renault's computerised strategy system had not worked properly at the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix. He also advised the Stewards of a situation of which Mr Alonso had reminded him, when full throttle had been applied by Mr Alonso in circumstances where there had been wheel spin.

Other Engineers:

27. On 27 August, the Stewards also interviewed other largely more junior Renault engineers, who worked closely with Mr Alonso and NPJ, and the team strategist. These individuals had been identified either because the Stewards expected they would be involved in strategy decisions or because they were thought to have examined relevant telemetry either at, or after, the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix. At the time of summoning the individuals, the Stewards had no reason to believe that they had been informed of the alleged plan to cause a deliberate crash on Lap 14. Rather, the Stewards wanted to ask the engineers about: (i) the genesis of the decisions to fuel Mr Alonso light and call him into the pits on Lap 12; and (ii) the telemetry relating to NPJ's crash.
28. A number of the other engineers commented that Renault had chosen a deliberately aggressive strategy for Mr Alonso, considering that to use the same strategy as those around Mr Alonso on the grid would have resulted in him finishing only a few places above his 15th place on the grid. Renault believed it had nothing to lose in taking an aggressive approach. The other engineers also commented that the softer, option tyres had been shown in practice to be good off the start but susceptible to rapid degradation and graining. This being the case, there had also been tyre-related reasons to fuel Alonso light and get the weaker option tyres out of the way on a comparatively short first stint.

29. A number of the other engineers commented that the telemetry data appeared to them to be inconclusive. It was possible, they felt, to interpret the data as indicative either of an accident or a deliberate crash.
30. Following the emergence of rumours in relation to NPJ's crash at the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix (including in the press and in various internet fora), certain of the other engineers had reviewed elements of the available telemetry data. One engineer had put the evidence to NPJ shortly after the crash and asked whether the crash had been deliberate. NPJ had refuted that suggestion.
31. On balance, the Stewards have no reason to believe that the other engineers were aware in advance of the race of the alleged plan to cause a deliberate crash at Turn 17 on Lap 14.

Mr Briatore:

32. Mr Briatore did not arrive at the circuit until the morning of 28 August 2009. On arrival, he was summoned to appear before the Stewards. He acknowledged that, by then, he was aware of the Stewards' Investigation. In interview, Mr Briatore provided certain documentation relating to the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix and Renault's dealings with NPJ and his father, Mr Piquet Snr. Mr Briatore also provided a letter dated 28 July 2009, which he had written on Renault headed paper and in which he accused the Piquet family of, inter alia, extortion. (A copy of the letter dated 28 July 2009 is provided at **Appendix 5** to this report.) This letter was written after he had informed NPJ (on approximately 12 July 2009) that Renault would be exercising an option to terminate NPJ's contract. Mr Briatore's letter alleged that the Piquet family had been trying to extort money or services from him in exchange for not revealing information in relation to NPJ's crash at the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix.
33. The Stewards understand from the interview that Mr Briatore had carried out no internal investigation before sending the letter, which included a denial of having knowledge of a deliberate crash. The Stewards also note that, notwithstanding the seriousness of the allegations made against him and Renault by NPJ, Mr Briatore offered to avoid escalating the dispute between the two parties.
34. At interview, Mr Briatore also talked at length about the contractual situation between Renault and NPJ. Mr Briatore stated that at the time of the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix, NPJ did not have a contract offer from Renault for the 2009 season. NPJ's contract for 2009 was concluded at the Brazilian Grand Prix, on 2 November 2008.
35. Mr Briatore pointed out repeatedly that NPJ's 2009 contract was on terms less advantageous to NPJ than his 2008 contract. Specifically, NPJ had taken a salary cut (from \$1.5 million to \$1 million) and Renault had included a performance clause in the contract providing that Renault would be able to terminate NPJ's contract in the event that he performed significantly worse than his team-mate Mr

Alonso. Mr Briatore considered this evidence to demonstrate that the allegations regarding a deliberate crash must be false. Mr Briatore said that, if NPJ had done Mr Briatore a favour by crashing deliberately in order to benefit the team, that "favour" would have been rewarded with a more, not less, advantageous contract.

36. As regards the specific questions that the Stewards were investigating, Mr Briatore responded as follows:

36.1 he insisted that as far as he was aware, the crash had not been deliberate and had not been part of a plan;

36.2 he accepted that a meeting took place on the Sunday of the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix in his office between himself, Mr Symonds and NPJ;

36.3 he denied that there had been any discussion at that meeting of a deliberate crash. Mr Briatore stated that the meeting had been called to encourage NPJ to focus on the race instead of his recent contract negotiations;

36.4 he denied any knowledge of the short follow-up meeting at which Mr Symonds was said to have instructed NPJ to crash at Turn 17 on Lap 14;

36.5 he initially denied having discretely said "thank you" to NPJ after the race, though then suggested that he might have said it "as a joke maybe".

36.6 in relation to matters pertaining to race strategy, that he was not involved in deciding race strategy either in general or at the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix.

37. Mr Briatore's position is perhaps best summed up by the following excerpt from the transcript: "*I never talk with Nelsinho, I never talk about to crashing the car, he's never coming to me tell me 'Flavio Jesus Christ I crash the car, you won the race, can you renew my contract?' You know if somebody do you a favour like that I just you renew the contract.*"

38. In response to enquiries about the telemetry data, Mr Briatore said that there was little point in asking his opinion on the charts produced by the FIA Technical Department. He was content for those points to be addressed by Mr Alonso and by Renault's engineers.

39. Mr Briatore also suggested that the Stewards should meet with both NPJ's trainer and Matthieu Michel of Mr Briatore's management company. Mr Briatore was of the view that these individuals would provide evidence in relation to NPJ's fragile state of mind at the time of the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix. However, as this point was made by NPJ himself in his statements to the FIA, this was not deemed necessary.

(D) The information contained in the data file provided by Renault

40. At the time of the interviews on 27 and 28 August, the Stewards did not have access either the pit-to-car communications or the information provided on hard disc by Renault. As a result, the review of the information provided has been focussed on the elements that the Stewards considered to be of most relevance to NPJ's allegations. Relevant sections of the pit-to-car communications have been transcribed by the FIA's external advisers and appear at **Appendix 6** to this report.
41. The information provided appears to be relevant to three key points: (i) the decision that Alonso would start on a light fuel load and would pit earlier than anticipated; (ii) whether NPJ asked what lap he was on before Lap 14; and (iii) what was said by the Renault team, particularly Mr Briatore and Mr Symonds, around the time of NPJ's crash at Turn 17 of Lap 14.

The decision to pit Alonso early

42. A document on the Renault hard disc entitled "*Singapore GP 2008 Pre race sheet*" appears to set out three potential strategies for both Fernando Alonso and NPJ (consisting of one-stop, two-stop and three-stop strategies for each driver). The document shows that a two-stop strategy for Alonso targets pitstops on Laps 14 and 46, while the same strategy for NPJ targets pitstops on Laps 28 and 44. A three-stop strategy for Alonso targets pitstops on Laps 14, 32 and 49. It appears from the documentation that the primary race strategy for Mr Alonso was a three-stop strategy.
43. An additional document on the Renault hard disc (entitled "*Fernando Alonso's race runsheet*") details Mr Alonso's lap times and the level of fuel in his car on each lap. The document demonstrates that Mr Alonso had 8.49kg of fuel when he came in for his first pitstop on Lap 12. As such, it appears that Mr Alonso had enough fuel at the start of the race to complete around 14 laps.
44. The pit-to-car communications support the documentary assertion that the primary race strategy for Alonso was a three-stop strategy and appear to indicate that the reason for switching from the primary three-stop strategy to a two-stop strategy was because Mr Alonso would otherwise be held up behind Mr Nakajima, the Williams driver. The pit-to-car communications demonstrate that Mr Symonds was the driving force behind the decision to switch to a two-stop strategy and that Mr Symonds was also behind the decision to pit Mr Alonso two laps earlier than had been envisaged. Relevant extracts are as follows.
45. Early in the race, Mr Symonds states "*while we're behind Nakajima we're f***ed, we're not going anywhere*". Approximately 30 seconds later, Mr Symonds says "*I can tell you now we're not three-stopping*." Around one minute later, Mr Symonds states "*don't worry about fuel [running out] because I'm going to get him out of this traffic earlier than that*."

46. Later in the race (but before Mr Alonso's first pitstop), Mr Symonds says "we're gonna go [to] two [stops]". Target laps are then discussed whereupon Mr Symonds is told that Mr Alonso is currently lapping 1.5 seconds quicker than Mr Nakajima. Mr Symonds responds "one and a half...so we're going to catch him in about three laps...[...].right, I'm going to, I think we're going to stop him just before we catch him and get him out of it, the reason being we've still got this worry on the fuel pump, it's only a couple of laps short, we're going to be stopping him early and we're going to go to Lap 40". In light of the Stewards' conclusions in relation to Mr Symonds' evidence at interview, this extract could be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to put on record reasons for calling in Mr Alonso on Lap 12 rather than on the anticipated Lap 14. However, the extract could also be indicative of genuine concerns regarding Mr Alonso's fuel pump and track position. The Stewards draw no conclusions in this regard.
47. Moments later, Mr Briatore interjects, saying "'cause no way we're overtaking Nakajima with these tyre[s]". Mr Symonds agrees, saying "exactly and I don't want to waste one second behind him...[...].OK I think I'm going to stop him at the end of 12, that looks like it's all going to work out".
48. Around one minute later, a race engineer says "Pat, do you still not think that this is a bit early? We only did 6/10ths [quicker than Mr Nakajima] that lap." Mr Symonds replies "no, no, it's going to be alright." The race engineer says "OK, OK, understood...[...].just we were 3.1 [seconds behind Mr Nakajima] that last lap". Mr Symonds responds "yeah, I mean, we might get one more lap but I'm not gonna risk missing anything."
49. Mr Alonso comes in for his first pitstop at Lap 12, whereupon Mr Briatore says "anyway, we had nothing to lose". Mr Symonds agrees, replying "exactly".
50. The documentary evidence and communications data relating to Mr Alonso's strategy suggest to the Stewards that the race engineers were not aware of there being any plan to cause a deliberate crash on Lap 14. However, in light of the evidence provided in the course of Mr Symonds' interview, it appears to the Stewards that Mr Symonds' interventions could be interpreted as reflective of knowledge on his part that a safety car would be deployed on Lap 14.

NPJ's lap queries

51. In his statements to the FIA, NPJ indicated that he requested confirmation of his current lap on several occasions in order to ensure that he crashed on the correct lap. NPJ says this was unusual. The FIA Technical Department also advises that seeking lap confirmation early in a race, and a long way in advance of a scheduled pit stop, is unusual conduct for a driver. The contention that NPJ requested confirmation of his current lap is supported by the pit-to-car communications. Relevant extracts are as follows.

52. On Lap 8, NPJ asks "what lap are we in, what lap are we in?" A race engineer says: "he just asked what lap are we in." Mr Symonds responds "yeah, tell him that he's about to complete Lap 8. Is that correct?" The race engineer replies "that's correct yeah, but I think he was asking what lap are we in though but, which he already knows." Mr Symonds says "no just tell him, he is about, he's just completing, he is about to complete Lap 8".
53. A few moments later, the race engineer says to NPJ "you've just completed Lap 8, you've just completed Lap 8." NPJ replies "I can't see Gabria [NPJ's pit board holder], I can't see Gabria." Symonds says to the pit team "say understood, he can't see the pit board". A race engineer says to NPJ "understood". Approximately one minute later, NPJ says "it's better to count through the laps because I cannot see Gabria".
54. It is to be remembered that the race was the first night Grand Prix and NPJ says that the darkness was causing him difficulty in seeing the pit board. However, NPJ's comments in the radio communications are consistent with his statement and it is possible that the reason it was so important to NPJ to know what lap he was on so early in the race was to ensure that he carried out the alleged plan on the correct lap.

NPJ's crash

55. In the moments following Mr Alonso's first pitstop, Mr Symonds says "right, now let's concentrate on Nelson." A race engineer states that NPJ should be pushed to overtake Mr Barrichello, the Honda driver. Mr Symonds interjects "just hang on, let me just look at the end of this lap please...[...]...I just want to see where he is."
56. Around 30 seconds elapse. Then, as NPJ starts Lap 14, Symonds states: "OK right [race engineer], you gotta push him really bloody hard now, if he doesn't get past Barrichello he's a, he's going nowhere, he's got to get past Barrichello this lap." Mr Briatore adds: "tell him, push". The race engineer passes on the instructions to NPJ. Mr Symonds reiterates: "tell him to push really hard."
57. Approximately one minute later, while still on Lap 14, NPJ crashes.
58. When the safety car comes out, Mr Symonds is the first to identify that the crash has occurred at Turn 17. Mr Symonds instructs Mr Alonso's race engineer to: "tell him be careful, be careful, turn 17 I think it is."
59. On apparently seeing a re-run of footage of the crash, Mr Briatore states "f***ing disgrace, f***ing, he's not a driver."
60. In light of the evidence provided by in the course of Mr Symonds' interview, the Stewards find it noteworthy that Mr Symonds initiates the majority of material communications with NPJ in the period immediately prior to the crash on Lap 14.

(E) **The Stewards' preliminary conclusions regarding the incident**

61. It was accepted by Renault's Executive Director of Engineering, Pat Symonds, that there was a discussion regarding causing a deliberate crash between him and NPJ on Saturday 27 September 2008. This admission appears to give substantial support to NPJ's allegations that the crash was deliberate.
62. Mr Symonds said that it was NPJ who first suggested that a deliberate crash could be caused. The Stewards have not been able to put that allegation to NPJ prior to producing this report. Mr Symonds declined to give any more detail on this subject, either at interview on 27 or on 28 August.
63. Despite being very responsive throughout the rest of the interview, Mr Symonds declined to answer a number of key questions, for reasons he would not expand upon. The Stewards did not consider it appropriate to seek to compel Mr Symonds to answer these questions after he had declined to do so. However, Mr Symonds was warned that conclusions might be drawn from his refusal to answer the questions. He said that he "*would absolutely expect*" that conclusions would be drawn from his refusal to answer, but stated that he had not lied during his interview.
64. Taken together: (i) Mr Symonds' admission of the discussion of a deliberate crash prior to the race; (ii) Mr Symonds' refusal to answer questions in relation to the matters discussed at the meeting with Mr Briatore and NPJ; and (iii) Mr Symonds' refusal to deny that he indicated to NPJ where and on which lap he ought to crash, have led the Stewards to consider it reasonable, on balance, to conclude that the allegations made by NPJ are, in large part, true.
65. In addition, while the Stewards would not have found it to be conclusive if taken alone, the telemetry data relating to NPJ's crash appears to indicate a counter-intuitive response from NPJ as he begins to lose control of the car on Turn 17. Rather than lift off the throttle until the wheelspin is corrected, NPJ reapplies 100% throttle pressure and then keeps his foot down. Even when the level of wheel spin is increasing, NPJ continues to apply the throttle at 100%. The Stewards agree with the FIA Technical Department that this was a highly unusual approach for a driver on a tight street circuit with a concrete wall to the outside of the corner. On balance, when considered in light of the admission referenced at paragraph 61 above, the information appears to the Stewards to be suggestive of a deliberate crash and supportive of the allegations made by NPJ as to how he went about causing the crash.
66. As regards Mr Briatore, the allegations from NPJ and both the comments made and refusal to answer questions at interview by Mr Symonds appear to the Stewards to indicate that there may have been some discussion in Mr Briatore's presence of the possibility of causing a deliberate crash to benefit the team. However, in light of Mr Briatore's vehement denial of any knowledge of a plan to crash deliberately, the Stewards do not consider that they are in a position to draw


any definitive conclusion regarding Mr Briatore's knowledge or involvement. The Stewards would observe, however: (i) that Mr Briatore's reaction to being told by the Stewards in interview that his Executive Director of Engineering had admitted to discussing a deliberate crash with NPJ did not appear to be one of shock and/or anger; and (ii) that the letter Mr Briatore sent to the Piquets in relation to allegations of extortion was a strange reaction to such a serious allegation. The more logical response from a position of innocence might have been either to launch an internal investigation or to report the allegations to the FIA and take all necessary steps to confirm they were unfounded, thereby removing the alleged threat of extortion.

67. As regards Mr Alonso and the other engineers, the Stewards have found no evidence to suggest that they knew anything about any plan to cause a deliberate crash on Lap 14. Renault's strategy was aggressive and somewhat unusual but the Stewards do not conclude that individuals at Renault other than NPJ, Mr Symonds and possibly Mr Briatore were aware of any crash plan. This position appears to be supported by the documentary and radio communications evidence provided by Renault.
68. In his statements to the FIA, NPJ indicated that he requested confirmation of his current lap on several occasions in order to ensure that he crashed on the correct lap. The contention that NPJ requested confirmation of his current lap is supported by the pit-to-car communications.
69. The Stewards consider that there is evidence, which, on balance, suggests that NPJ's crash was deliberate and formed part of a plan aimed at securing a benefit for the team in which at least one senior Renault team member was complicit. Given the seriousness of the allegations and the supporting evidence, the Stewards are of the view that the matter should be referred to a meeting of the World Motor Sport Council for consideration.

4 September 2009

Lars Österlind

FIA International Steward

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a large, stylized loop followed by a horizontal line and a vertical stroke.

Vassilis Despotopoulos

FIA International Steward



Lars Österlind
FIA International Steward

Vassilis Despotopoulos
FIA International Steward

**2008 Singapore Grand Prix
 Transcript of Extracts from Renault file
 “everything_08R15_Race_2008 192002”**

Time	Person speaking	Text
00.50.07	[Engineer]	Still don't have, I don't have any laps or gaps in position, nothing.
		[Pause]
	[Engineer]	Fuel for Fernando is 43, four three.
	[Engineer]	What's that [Engineer]?
		[Pause]
	[Engineer]	I didn't say anything [Engineer].
	[Engineer]	43, four three, for Fernando?
	[Engineer]	Okay sorry, 43 for Fernando.
	[Engineer]	[Engineer] you restarted it yet or not?
	[Engineer]	Yeah, starting takes ages.
	[Engineer]	Nakajima was being told that Trulli was heavy so he needs to overtake him as well.
	Pat Symonds	While we're behind Nakajima we're f***ed, we're not going anywhere.
	[Engineer]	I agree.
	Pat Symonds	I'm also...
	[Engineer]	It's f***ing our three stop isn't it completely.
	Pat Symonds	Yeah absolutely. I'm also concerned about that that fuel current thing, um as soon as we get laps coming in I'm gonna look for gaps.
	[Engineer]	All right mate.
[Engineer]	I agree. Stupid [<i>inaudible</i>].	
Flavio Briatore	The problem is Trulli.	
[Engineer]	Yeah, it's Trulli. I mean he's three seconds slower than	

Time	Person speaking	Text
00.53.01		Heidfeld.
	Pat Symonds	Yep.
	Flavio Briatore	I don't understand why Rosberg not try hard.
	[Engineer]	Yep.
	Pat Symonds	I can tell you now we're not three-stopping.
	[Engineer]	Okay , [Engineer] get ready for a change.
	[Engineer]	Yep.
	[[Engineer]	I'm still waiting [Engineer].
	[Engineer]	Okay.
	[Engineer]	Did you check you don't have a fuss with the time zone or, or the date or something stupid like that?
	[Engineer]	No it, it was fine as it was.
	[Engineer]	Okay.
	[Engineer]	That was an awful second sector for us anyway.
	[Engineer]	At this space for Fernando we are lap 15 so far and maybe we get to 16. We'll see how it develops.
	[Engineer]	Okay.
	Pat Symonds	[Engineer], don't worry about fuel because I'm going to get him out of this traffic earlier than that.
	[Engineer]	Okay.
	Pat Symonds?	Any question of how much [<i>inaudible</i>].
	[Engineer]	Everything looks okay with the fuel system at the moment.
	[Engineer]	Okay.
Flavio Briatore	A yellow flag went up.	
[Engineer]	Looks like something on the circuit [<i>inaudible</i>] looks like someone's knee support.	
[Engineer]	Yes, there's a yellow flag – where is it?	

Time	Person speaking	Text
	[Engineer]	Between nine and ten.
	[Engineer]	Between nine and ten.
	[Engineer]	A yellow flag nine ten.
	[Engineer]	There's a bit of debris in the middle of the circuit there.
	[Engineer]	Maybe debris on the circuit. Yellow flag between nine and ten and we think there's debris on the circuit.
	Pat Symonds	That's not gonna be a safety car.
	Fernando Alonso	Okay, okay.
	[Engineer]	Okay, Nelson completed 5 laps. The estimate is 28.7 mixer five 29.5 on mixer three and the fuel load is 38 kilos, three eight.
	[Engineer]	Okay 38 three eight for Nelson.
	Pat Symonds	Keep him on five.
	[Engineer]	Okay, break temps at the moment.
	Flavio Briatore	[Inaudible] Fernando will be going nowhere?
	Pat Symonds	Absolutely. Um we've got a little strategy programme problem but as soon as I've got it back I'm gonna be looking for a gap to put him in.
		[Pause]
	[Engineer]	And fuel [inaudible] on next straight.
	[Engineer]	Thank you very much.
		[Pause]
	[Engineer]	Someone [inaudible].
	[Engineer]	It's started but there's no film feed yet.
	[Engineer]	Still yellow nine and ten.
	[Engineer]	How about that [Engineer], try that, anything?
	[Engineer]	[Inaudible]

Time	Person speaking	Text
00.56.44	[Engineer]	Yes ten.
	Pat Symonds	I'm not gonna get anything through [Engineer].
	[Engineer]	Try disconnect reconnect Pat.
	Pat Symonds	Okay. [Pause]
	[Engineer]	Fail sensor ten and still yellow.
	[Engineer]	Rosberg plus Trulli.
	[Engineer]	Okay I've got film activity.
	Pat Symonds	That just makes it worse for us...[inaudible] led lap.
	Flavio Briatore	Let's see the Japanese now yutaw tau.
	[Engineer]	Pumps okay. [Pause]
	Pat Symonds	I think Rosberg will be quite light because he's on options but this is still bad news for us. We've, we've gotta think out of the box now.
	[Engineer]	Okay, [Engineer] it says lapdate has been reset for unknown session so it looks like...it doesn't recognise this as a race if you like.
	[Engineer]	Okay.
	Flavio Briatore	Fernando need to overtake somebody there because that is not...
	Pat Symonds	Yeah.
	Flavio Briatore	That Trulli's very slow eh?
	[Engineer]	Okay, I'll tell him.
	[Engineer]	Clear track, clear track.
[Engineer]	Track clear, track clear.	
[Engineer]	Just got alarm for charging system failed.	

Time	Person speaking	Text
	[Engineer]	Track is clear, track is clear and come on Nelson you need to overtake Barrichello.
	[Engineer]	What's failed [Engineer]?
	[Engineer]	Charging system failed. Um, triggers if the supply current is below 15 amps.
	[Engineer]	Got an alternator problem.
	[Engineer]	Okay.
	Pat Symonds	I need as much information as I can get on that as quickly as possible please.
	[Engineer]	[Engineer] is that a false alarm?
	Pat Symonds	And it's Fernando's car we're talking about?
	[Engineer]	Yes.
	[Engineer]	[Engineer] is looking after that.
	Pat Symonds	Okay, I need an answer in the next err three laps thanks a lot.
	[Engineer]	From here we can't see this this alarm so...
	[Engineer]	Okay, maybe its just my telemetry.
	[Engineer]	I've got it on mine.
	Flavio Briatore	[<i>Inaudible</i>]...Nakajima.
	Pat Symonds	Nakajima yeah.
	Flavio Briatore	Yeah, come on.
	[Engineer]	Are we passed Nakajima?
	[Engineer]	Yeah
	[Engineer]	Or is it just Nakajima's got passed Trulli?
	Nelson Piquet Jnr	What lap are we in, what lap are we in?
	[Engineer]	Nakajima's got past Trulli.

Time	Person speaking	Text
	[Engineer]	It's not a false alarm but we're looking for the data to see proper value of all the [inaudible] but so far we don't see anything.
	[Engineer]	He just asked what lap are we in.
	Pat Symonds	Yeah, tell him that he's about to complete lap 8. Is that correct?
	[Engineer]	That's correct yeah. I think he was asking what lap are we in though but, which he already knows.
	Pat Symonds	No just tell him, he is about, he's just completing, he is about to complete lap 8.
	[Engineer]	Understood.
	[Engineer]	Someone hearing any news – anything?
	[Engineer]	I'm just changing something now, hang on.
	Flavio Briatore	[inaudible] came though yeah?
	[Engineer]	You've just completed lap 8, you've just completed lap 8.
	Nelson Piquet Jnr	I can't see Gabria, I can't see Gabria.
	[Engineer]	Okay, want to tell him this straight yes?
	Pat Symonds	Just say understood – say understood. He can't see the pit board.
	[Engineer]	Okay – understood.
	Pat Symonds	Don't worry [Engineer].
	[Engineer]	Okay, I think we've got him.
	[Engineer]	Understood.
	Pat Symonds	Gabriel – can you hear?
	[Engineer]	He just said "yes".
	Pat Symonds	Okay. Just try and get that pit board a bit further out, wave it or do something like that.
	[Engineer]	Okay, we cannot see anything wrong on the alternator for Fernando's car; the issue the only point we can see is he's

Time	Person speaking	Text
01.00.50		been low on the rev at some points or maybe we could have triggered something very lightly but, that's all.
	Pat Symonds	Okay. Understood.
	[Engineer]	No worries.
	Pat Symonds	Right, what have we got; f***ing hell we've got seven seconds to Nakajima.
	[Engineer]	I'm just restarting the servers again [Engineer].
	[Engineer]	Okay, trying to restart client.
	Nelson Piquet Jnr	It's better to count through the laps because I cannot see Gabria.
	[Engineer]	It's better Gabriel on the last lap I guess we should leave him.
	Pat Symonds	And then see how quickly we can catch up on Nakajima. Nakajima's doing 50.3.
	[Engineer]	No, he's going to be much quicker this lap.
	[Engineer]	1.3 up at the moment.
	[Engineer]	And these tyres are s***.
	Pat Symonds	We need to...I need a bit of help here cos we haven't got any strategy system.
	[Engineer]	I just think, I can't believe we can't lap at Nakajima's pace; I'm just worried these tyres are useless and we should get on the other ones.
	Pat Symonds	Yeah, exactly ...
	[Engineer]	We 9/10ths up at the moment.
	Flavio Briatore	Just wait one second guys.
	[Engineer]	We've got a much better first sector to come on here.
	Flavio Briatore	Maybe, you know, maybe we need to quicken up now.
	[Engineer]	Yeah, we gone quicker now than Nakajima.
Pat Symonds	[Engineer], we're gonna go two.	

Time	Person speaking	Text
	[Engineer]	Okay.
	Pat Symonds	Um, what was our target without this now?
	[Engineer]	Um, 40 was the sort of optimum, and then 40 up to 46 if he wanted to cover...
	Pat Symonds	I think we'll stay at around the 40 mark.
	[Engineer]	Predicted what 47.6 for this lap.
	Pat Symonds	47 - 6.
	[Engineer]	Yeah.
	Pat Symonds	So point 8, point 8 quicker than Nakajima's last one yeah?
	[Engineer]	47 - 1 predicted now. We're two seconds up at the moment on that lap.
	[Engineer]	We've gone below one and a half seconds quicker than him.
	Pat Symonds	One and a half...so we're going to catch him in about three laps. Yeah?
	[Engineer]	Yep.
	Pat Symonds	Right, I'm going to ... I think we're going to stop him just before we catch him and get him out of it, the reason being we've still got this worry on the on the fuel pump, it's only a couple of laps short, we're going to be stopping him early and we're going to go to lap 40.
	[Engineer]	Yeah I think so.
	Pat Symonds	4 - 0. Lap 40.
	[Engineer]	How's the balance, Fernando how's the balance?
	Pat Symonds	Um, acknowledge please Freddie.
	Fernando Alonso	Very poor grip.
	[Engineer]	Can you repeat that please?
	[Engineer]	Okay let's stay as we are, it will be tyres yeah?
	Pat Symonds	That confirms it.

Time	Person speaking	Text
	Flavio Briatore	'Cause no way we're overtaking Nakajima with these tyre.
	Pat Symonds	Exactly, exactly and I don't want to waste one second behind him.
	[Engineer]	What lap you're claiming Pat?
	Pat Symonds	Um lap ... we're coming in in a couple of laps something like that and then I want you to get to lap 40 please – four zero.
	[Engineer]	Okay lap 40... which fuel system-wise I think we can...we can go easily to lap 12 without any problem.
	Pat Symonds	Okay, I think I'm going to stop him the end of 12, that looks like it's all going to work out.
	Fernando Alonso	Maybe over steering.
	[Engineer]	I'm quite aggressive on rear pressures Pat so...
	[Engineer]	Alright don't do anything it's gonna be a different story on the other tyre I would imagine.
	Pat Symonds	Yeah exactly.
	[Engineer]	Scupper our rear isn't it so.
	Pat Symonds	Yeah that wasn't a great centre. Right, we're gonna stop at the end of lap 12 guys; we're going to lap 40.
	[Engineer]	63 kilogrammes for Fernando – 6 - 3. Okay?
	[Engineer]	Okay, 63 it is.
	[Engineer]	Okay so pit stop light is...sorry that was too early.
	[Engineer]	Lights on now.
	[Engineer]	Okay light is on.
	Pat Symonds	Yeah with a good lap we're going to be within a second and a half of him which is right.
	[Engineer]	Pat do you still not think that this is a bit early? We only did 6/10ths that lap.
	Pat Symonds	No, no it's going to be alright.

Time	Person speaking	Text
	[Engineer]	Okay, okay. Understood.
	Flavio Briatore	[inaudible]...behind Nakajima now.
	Pat Symonds	I'm having to hand calculate because we haven't got.
	[Engineer]	Okay. Just we were 3.1 that last lap.
	Pat Symonds	Yeah, I mean we might be able to get one more lap but I'm not gonna risk missing anything.
	[Engineer]	Okay Pat, understood understood.
	[Engineer]	[Engineer] so its multi-map 2 and the clutch trim stays where it is in 7.
	[Engineer]	Okay mate...[Inaudible]...just to confirm R2, R2.
	[Engineer]	[inaudible]
	[Engineer]	Yes [Engineer] yep that's right.
	[Engineer]	[inaudible]...front and rear.
	[Engineer]	We've got very very low brake [inaudible].
	[Engineer]	Yes we're calling the guys in.
	[Engineer]	And in now Fernando in now pit confirm. 40 seconds Fernando.
	Fernando Alonso	Okay in now.
		[Pause].
	Flavio Briatore	Anyway we had nothing to lose.
	Pat Symonds	Exactly.
	[Engineer]	62 [Engineer], 6 - 2.
	[Engineer]	20 seconds Fernando. Multi-map 2, multi-map 2. Guys he's gonna be target plus 8 isn't he if we go into lap 40, 32 was the original one.
	[Engineer]	Yep.
	[Engineer]	You okay for me to tell him that Pat?

Time	Person speaking	Text
01.07.16	Pat Symonds	Yep.
	[Engineer]	Fernando you are target plus 8 target plus 8, remember the white line.
	[Engineer]	7.5 Alonso.
	[Engineer]	He'll know from that we changed the two stops won't he we don't need to explain that to him?
	[Engineer]	Yep
	Pat Symonds	Look, [Engineer].
	[Engineer]	61.5 kilos, 61.5.
	[Engineer]	Okay 61.5.
	[Engineer]	Driving sector 3.
	Pat Symonds	[Engineer]I want you to concentrate on getting this f***ing strategy system working. Um, [Engineer] if you can start working out next stops on the times we're getting, we'll just have to do it manually.
	[Engineer]	Okay.
	[Engineer]	I'm working on it [Engineer]. [Pause].
	Pat Symonds	Right, now let's concentrate on Nelson.
	[Engineer]	Pitstop lights gents.
	[Engineer]	[Engineer] break taps before we stop, 6-10 front and rear. Predicting 27 mill, end of race.
	[Engineer]	Okay, okay, so unless something changes, I'm happy.
	[Engineer]	[Engineer] can you give me some feedback from the pitstop because we've got a massive hole in the telemetry just over at, I couldn't see anything.
	[Engineer]	Sorry mate I didn't see anything.
	[Engineer]	He just sat behind Barrichello ain't he and he's got massive straight line speed give him a little hurry up [Engineer] tell him he's got a load of straight line and advantage on him.

Time	Person speaking	Text
	Pat Symonds	Just hang on...
	Flavio Briatore	Tell him to push.
	Pat Symonds	...Let me just look at the end of this lap please. Just one minute [Engineer] please I just want to see where he is.
	[Engineer]	Understood Pat.
	[Engineer]	Bourdais' spun, so he's made a place up there. [Pause].
	[Engineer]	[inaudible] go to R2.
	[Engineer]	Okay [Engineer]
	Pat Symonds	Okay right [Engineer], you've gotta push him really bloody hard now if he doesn't get past Barrichello he's a, he's going nowhere, he's got to get past Barrichello this lap.
	Flavio Briatore	Tell him, push.
	[Engineer]	Nelson no excuses now you've got to get past Barrichello you've got four clicks straight line advantage come on you've got to push now you must get past him.
	Pat Symonds	Tell him to push really hard. [Pause].
	[Engineer]	This lap now for Nelson is 29 point 1 for mixer five.
	Pat Symonds	Thank you 29 - 1?
	[Engineer]	29 - 1, yes.
	Pat Symonds	Okay, new target's 29 - 1.
	[Engineer]	Okay.
	[Engineer]	Fuel level still at 38 kilos?
	[Engineer]	It's meant to be a little bit less I won't [inaudible] but you can consider 37, 3 - 7.
	[Engineer]	Okay 3 - 7 it is, 3 - 7.
	Pat Symonds	Any clues yet [Engineer]?

Time	Person speaking	Text
	[Engineer]	No.
	[Engineer]	To me it looks like it didn't recognise the the session as the race of the laptimes are going through somewhere but it doesn't appear there.
	Pat Symonds	No, you've got a heartbeat I take it?
	[Engineer]	No.
	[Multiple voices]	Nelson's off. F***ing hell. Nelson's had a crash I would say that would be a red flag its huge [<i>all speaking at the same time</i>].
	Nelson Piquet Jnr	Sorry guys. I had a little outing.
	[Engineer]	Is he alright? Is he alright
	Pat Symonds	Ask him if he's alright.
	[Engineer]	Are you okay? Are you okay?
	[Engineer]	Fernando's just gone past it.
	[Engineer]	Okay yellow flag
	Nelson Piquet Jnr	Yeah I hit my head in the back. I think I'm okay.
	[Engineer]	Okay understood.
	Pat Symonds	Right [<i>inaudible</i>] stop him.
	[Engineer]	Safety car, safety car, safety car, safety car, Fernando safety car mixture three.
	Pat Symonds	Tell him be careful, be careful, turn 17 I think it is.
	[Engineer]	Mixture three, mixture three.
	[Engineer]	Pat he went through it just after him.
	Pat Symonds	Okay thank you.
	[Engineer]	P zero, P zero
	[Engineer]	[Engineer], he just follows it yeah?

Time	Person speaking	Text
01.11.09	[Engineer]	He follows it unless he gets a green light.
	Fernando Alonso	I overtake the safety car or no?
	[Engineer]	You follow it Fernando follow it unless you get a green light, follow the safety car unless you get a green light.
	[Engineer]	F***ing hell that was a big shunt.
	Flavio Briatore	F***ing hell...my every f***ing disgrace, f***ing, he's not a driver.
	[Engineer]	So Fernando just to be clear mixture three and you follow it unless you get a green light.
	[Engineer]	Yeah he's on mixture three and <i>[inaudible]</i> three.
	Fernando Alonso	Okay.
	Pat Symonds	What position is Fernando in?
	[Engineer]	Well we were twenty, and we're first guy to pick the safety car up.
	Pat Symonds	Yeah we're not.
	[Engineer]	He will get away past it but he's got to wait.
	Pat Symonds	Yeah.
	[Engineer]	[Engineer] the car is burning. I don't know, uh, [Engineer].
	[Engineer]	Someone dealing I've got <i>[inaudible]</i> from the film or the race status it's all, it's all dead. Do you have any clue?
	[Engineer]	I'm working with [Engineer] on it now.
	[Engineer]	Okay.
	[Engineer]	Not at the moment.
	[Engineer]	Okay Williams are refuelling
	Fernando Alonso	Pit lane is closed isn't it?
[Engineer]	Yes, yes it is.	


Time	Person speaking	Text
	[Engineer]	Yes, yes pit lane is closed.
	[Engineer]	6.8 Williams and a penalty. Rosberg.
	[Engineer]	Did those guys ever get in before the safety car came in?
	Pat Symonds	Yes I think so, yeah.
	[Engineer]	Okay.
	[Engineer]	Yes I think both Red Bulls didn't they?
	Fernando Alonso	Is the pit lane closed?
	[Engineer]	Yes, yes.
	Pat Symonds	The pit lane is closed
	[Engineer]	Yes, the pit lane is closed Fernando, the pit lane is closed
	Fernando Alonso	Rosberg he pit now hasn't he?
	Pat Symonds	Yes he'll get a penalty.
	[Engineer]	Yes Rosberg pitted, he will get a penalty there were guys that pitted before it came out we believe, think the Red Bulls.
	[Engineer]	And probably Barrichello.
	Fernando Alonso	I have the green flag, I will overtake.
	[Engineer]	Okay Fernando.
	[Engineer]	Okay.
	Flavio Briatore	What position we are now in the all this?
	Pat Symonds	To be honest, I don't know Flavio. It's got to have been good for Fernando but I honestly don't know where he is.
	[Engineer]	It's good for changing his tyres.
	Pat Symonds	There's a Honda stop.
	[Engineer]	Probably run out of fuel.

Time	Person speaking	Text
	Flavio Briatore	There could [<i>inaudible</i>] fuel.
	[Engineer]	Looks like Barrichello run out, [Engineer]?
	Pat Symonds	Yeah he may well have run out, he'd have been long though wouldn't he?
	[Engineer]	Nah, he'd have been heavy.
	[Engineer]	Is Fernando doing a reasonable pace he needs to sort of get on with it catch the safety car up again really.
	[Engineer]	He's going reasonably.
	[Engineer]	Okay.
	[Engineer]	It's reasonable Steve it's not fantastic.
	[Engineer]	Alright.
	[Engineer]	What do you want to do guys?
	[Engineer]	Whatever's reasonable.
	[Engineer]	We want to keep it out don't we, we want to keep the safety car out don't we?
	[Engineer]	Yeah yeah but it won't make any difference though.
	[Engineer]	Okay I just thought it might put more penalties or is it open, the pit lane.
	[Engineer]	No, they'll open the pit lane.
	[Engineer]	Okay, I don't think they will.
	[Engineer]	But we don't need to be seen to be delaying it.
	[Engineer]	No, no exactly.
	[Engineer]	He's going, he was going at a reasonable pace.
	Pat Symonds	Barrichello, Barrichello did refuel. Who knows.
	[Engineer]	Did Coulthard and Webber refuel?
	Pat Symonds	I think they both got in before the pit lane closed, we think.
	[Engineer]	Do we know where they were going to?


Time	Person speaking	Text
	Pat Symonds	No.
	[Engineer]	Honda were affected by this, this interference and he stopped on the bridge.
	Pat Symonds	[Engineer] or [Engineer]. [Engineer] or [Engineer]. Any info on Red Bull refuel please?
	[Engineer]	Pit lane's still closed yep.
	[Engineer]	Negative I was waiting for Toyota <i>[inaudible]</i>
	[Engineer]	No I didn't see them come in.
	[Engineer]	That'll be a BMW and Ferrari coming in now I think.
	Pat Symonds	BMW and a Ferrari
	[Engineer]	BMW has a penalty. <i>[inaudible]</i>
	[Engineer]	Kubica.
	[Engineer]	7.85.
	[Engineer]	Kubica's has just refuelled. The pit lane was closed. They'll get a penalty.
	[Engineer]	Kubica 7.7.
	[Engineer]	Where is Nelson? Have you seen him?
	Flavio Briatore	Is he okay Nelson? Is he okay?
	[Engineer]	I dunno, yeah have you seen him?
	Fernando Alonso	The pit lane is still closed until we arrive?
	[Engineer]	He climbed out mate and ran across the track.
	[Engineer]	Yeah, pit lane is still closed.
	Pat Symonds	[Engineer], [Engineer] can you monitor channel, TV channel three and let me know as soon as the pit lane opens.
	Fernando Alonso	<i>[inaudible]</i>

Time	Person speaking	Text
01.15.12	[Engineer]	Okay understood Fernando.
	[Engineer]	We're, our pace at the moment is only 6 seconds off a flying lap.
	[Engineer]	Okay, got it.
	Fernando Alonso	I nearly repeat the time [<i>inaudible</i>].
	[Engineer]	I nearly repeat the time with the fuel.
	[Engineer]	He means first time laps.
	[Engineer]	Okay understood Fernando.
	Pat Symonds	[<i>inaudible</i>] just run over a marshall.
	[Engineer]	Okay so we are P16.
	Pat Symonds	Has Gabby gone to look for Nelson?
	[Engineer]	Yes.
Pat Symonds	OK. I mean I'm sure he's alright, he ran across the track alright.	


Track	Sessior	Sess.Date	Driver	Car	AbsRurLap	LapTime	MrkConsum	Level
A8-15 SingaporR	28/09/200	N Pique	RE_NP_c867	24712	1:50.87	280908	2024	
A8-15 SingaporR	28/09/200	N Pique	RE_NP_c868	24713	1:50.57	280908	2026	
A8-15 SingaporR	28/09/200	N Pique	RE_NP_c869	24714	1:50.45	280908	2028	
A8-15 SingaporR	28/09/200	N Pique	RE_NP_c870	24715	1:41.21	280908	2029	





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
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




LEGEND

-  DRIVER'S LINE
-  BRAKING DISTANCES
-  ASPHALT RUN OFF AREA
-  4m LONG TEMPORARY ARMCO/CONCRETE BARRIER
-  SPECTATOR FENCE (RED ZONE BOUNDARY)
-  TEC# TECPRO BARRIERS
-  111 (RUN) STRAIGHT AHEAD RUNOFF DISTANCE
-  111 BRAKING DISTANCE TO EXTERIOR OF CURVES
-  (R) TRACK STRAIGHT NUMBER

APPENDIX 1 – RECOVERY PLAN
 RECOVERY VEHICLE PLACEMENT
 2008 FORMULA 1™ SingTel Singapore Grand Prix
 15.09.08



LEGEND

PERIMETER FENCE (PRICE STANDING 11M)	
PERIMETER FENCE (SLICED) 10.5M	
EVENT PERIMETER NO FENCE	
WORKS AREA / INTERNAL FENCE (11M)	
SPECTATOR FENCE	
RESTRICTIVE EVENT FENCE (11M)	
EMERGENCY GATE	
INTERNAL GATE	
PERIMETER GATE	
CONTAINER	
CONCRETE BARRIER	
MARSHES	
OVERPASS	

MEP705-RW-004

MEP705-RW-003

MEP705-RW-002



Enstone, 28 July 2009

Mr. Nelson PIQUET
Rodovia DF-001, km 25
Fazenda Piquet
Brasilia
DF-BRASIL

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SENT BY EMAIL AND REGISTERED LETTER

Nelson,

I was extremely shocked to learn from Mathieu Michel, and from Bernie, as a matter of confirmation, that you would have declared that Nelsinho was asked by Renault to cause an accident in the 13th lap of the Grand Prix of Singapore, 2008, in order to have Fernando Alonso win this Grand Prix with the help of the pace car.

I was also extremely shocked to learn that you were threatening to make this contention before the FIA as a mean of pressure to obtain from Renault, against your silence, a continuation of the Driving Agreement relating to Nelsinho after the last Hungarian Grand Prix notwithstanding the option of termination set forth in favor of the team that was agreed upon between us at the outset of the Nurburgring Race.

Firstly, you can easily imagine that I can certainly not accept your contention that the Renault Team, myself, and your son entered into some sort of conspiracy that would not only have an impact on the result of the competition, but actually, that may put at risk the safety of all the contenders in the Grand Prix just to have Fernando Alonso obtaining a racing advantage. I am outraged that you could think that I myself, not mentioning your son and the other people in the Renault's Team, could have any part in such a strategy that may constitute a criminal offense.

Secondly, I am forced to consider that your threat constitutes without doubt a blatant attempt of exerting blackmail against Renault F1 and myself to extort an illegitimate advantage by way of threats and outrageous lies on the basis of an alleged hear-say.

RENAULT

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Telephone: +44 (0) 1608 678000 Facsimile: +44 (0) 1608 678800
Registered Office: 16 Old Bailey - London - EC4M 7EG - England. Registered in England No. 1806337

Page 2 of 2 N Piquet's letter 28/7/09

I would not wish this to escalate and I will put your current attitude on the ground of the disappointment and grief caused by the results obtained so far by Nelsinho in Formula 1. Please be advised, however that, should you take any step in relation with your blackmail, or make any declaration in connection thereof, I shall have no choice but to introduce against you, and against Nelsinho as the case may be, any action that way be appropriate before any criminal and civil court having jurisdiction on the ground of defamation, false accusation extortion.



Flavio BRIATORE
Managing Director Renault F1 Team Ltd



FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE DE L'AUTOMOBILE

**BY E-MAIL, FAX AND REGISTERED
LETTER**

ING RENAULT F1
Mr Flavio Briatore
Whiteways Technical Centre
OX7 4EE Enstone
U.K.

Geneva, 4 September 2009

Dear Sirs,

2008 Singapore Grand Prix

The FIA is in receipt of the enclosed report from the FIA International Stewards to the 2009 Belgian Grand Prix.

In view of the contents of the report, ING Renault F1 is hereby invited to appear at the forthcoming extraordinary meeting of the FIA World Motor Sport Council, which is to be held in Paris at 9.30 am on Monday 21 September 2009 at the FIA headquarters, 8 Place de la Concorde. The purpose of the meeting is to allow ING Renault F1 to answer charges that, at the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix, in breach of Articles 151c and/or point 2(c) of Chapter IV of Appendix L of the International Sporting Code, and/or in breach of Articles 3.2, 30.3 and/or 39.1 of the Formula One Sporting Regulations, it

- conspired with its driver, Nelson Piquet Junior, to cause a deliberate crash at the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix with the aim of causing the deployment of the safety car to the advantage of its other driver, Fernando Alonso.

At this meeting you may be assisted by the counsel of your choice and will be afforded the opportunity to make oral representations. In order to assist you in any preparations for the meeting, in addition to the report, we also enclose further documentation (including transcripts of the interviews carried out at the Belgian Grand Prix) of relevance to the Stewards' report. A full list of enclosures is set out at Appendix 1 to this letter.



Based on the facts and explanations put before the FIA World Motor Sport Council, it may determine whether ING Renault F1 has breached the International Sporting Code and/or the Formula One Sporting Regulations and may impose a penalty or penalties accordingly.

In addition to attending the meeting on 21 September 2009, you are invited to send us no later than Monday 14 September 2009 any written submissions you wish to make. We will make sure that any written comments we receive are circulated to the members of the World Motor Sport Council.

Yours faithfully

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'P. de Coninck', written over a horizontal line.

Pierre de Coninck
Secretary General FIA (Sport)

Enc.



APPENDIX 1

LIST OF ENCLOSURES

- 1 Letter from the International Stewards to the FIA President dated 4 September 2009 and enclosing the International Stewards' Report and Appendices thereto
- 2 Transcripts of interviews with Renault personnel
- 3 Copy of CD containing recordings of interviews with Renault personnel (to follow)
- 4 Copy of documents submitted to the Stewards by Mr Briatore at interview on 28 August 2009
- 5 Note of meeting between Mr Briatore and Stewards on 29 August 2009
- 6 Copy of documents submitted to the Stewards by Mr Briatore at meeting on 29 August 2009



FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE DE L' AUTOMOBILE

TELEFAX

A / TO :	ALL TITULAR MEMBERS OF THE WORLD MOTOR SPORT COUNCIL
DE / FROM :	Pierre de CONINCK – Secretary General of the FIA (Sport)
Date :	4 September 2009

Invitation to an Extraordinary meeting of the WMSC – Monday 21 September 2009

Dear President,

An extraordinary meeting of the WMSC will be held in Paris on 21 September 2009, starting at 9.30 a.m., to hear representations from ING Renault F1 (Renault) in relation to a charge that, at the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix, in breach of Articles 151(c) and/or point 2(c) of Chapter IV of Appendix L of the International Sporting Code, and/or in breach of Articles 3.2, 30.3 and/or 39.1 of the Formula One Sporting Regulations, it conspired with its driver, Nelson Piquet Junior, to cause a deliberate crash with the aim of causing the deployment of the safety car to the advantage of its other driver, Fernando Alonso.

It being impractical to reconvene the Stewards of the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix, an investigation was effected by the Stewards of the 2009 Belgian Grand Prix and the enclosed report has been prepared and sent to Renault. Additional documents (including transcripts of interviews with Renault personnel) have also been sent to Renault and will be available for Council members at the meeting on 21 September 2009. In the event that you would like to review these additional documents in advance of the meeting, please contact the FIA Secretariat.

Could you please confirm your attendance at the above meeting, by return fax? If you are unable to change your plans for this period, please be so kind as to indicate to which WMSC member you will give your proxy.

I thank you for your cooperation and remain,

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'P. de Coninck', is written over a horizontal line.

Pierre de Coninck



FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE DE L'AUTOMOBILE

**EXTRAORDINARY WORLD MOTOR SPORT COUNCIL
21 SEPTEMBER 2009 – FIA PARIS (SALLE DU COMITÉ) 9:30 AM**

PARTICIPATION FORM FOR TITULAR MEMBERS

NAME : _____

<input type="checkbox"/> WILL ATTEND THE MEETING	<input type="checkbox"/> WILL NOT ATTEND THE MEETING AND GIVE MY PROXY TO :
<input type="checkbox"/> WILL ATTEND THE LUNCH	<input type="checkbox"/> WILL NOT ATTEND THE LUNCH

Date:

Signature :